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iii 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. appellants respectfully petition this Court for 
rehearing. 
III. 
INTRODUCTION 
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the DeBrys 
waived their right to object to procedural irregularities. (See, 
Slip Opinion, Exhibit M at 2.) As a basis for granting summary 
disposition, this Court concluded: 
[A]ppellantsf motion to amend the December 11 
order did not mention any of the asserted 
irregularities but merely sought to delete 
references to rule 52(b). We therefore 
conclude that appellants have waived the right 
to assert that Fidelity committed procedural 
violations in obtaining the December 11 order. 
Slip Opinion at 2. 
Rehearing is appropriate in this case because the record 
shows that the alleged procedural irregularities by Fidelity's 
counsel were in fact raised in the trial court as a basis for 
asking the court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the 
December 11, 1990 order. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE PETITION 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court in this case granted 
summary judgment in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company ("Fidelity") and certified the case for appeal under Rule 
1 
54(b) U.R.C.P. Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity 
hand delivered Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment to the DeBrys1 counsel. (See Exhibit A, Appendix.) 
On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to all other counsel in 
the case. (Exhibit B, Appendix.) 
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings 
and judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit C, Appendix.) 
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys1 Counsel filed objections to 
the form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. (Exhibit D, Appendix.) 
Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed 
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed 
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit E, Appendix.) For the next seven 
months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot, 
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b) 
motion. 
Approximately seven months later, Fidelity, ex parte. 
obtained the signature of the trial court on an order which pur-
ported to deny a Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend the May 2, 
1990 judgment. (Exhibit F, Appendix.) 
Due to a filing error, counsel for the DeBrys was unaware 
the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit F) had been sent to the court. 
See, Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, Appendix, at para. 2. 
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Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990 
order, (Exhibit F) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal. 
Eight months later, when Fidelity filed its brief in the 
Court of Appeals, it then claimed the Court of Appeals had no 
jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys1 appeal on its merits because there 
was no notice of appeal filed following entry of the December 11, 
1990 Order. (Exhibit F.) See, Appellee's Brief filed in the Court 
of Appeals at Point I. (Exhibit H.) 
Upon receipt of appellee's brief, counsel for the DeBrys 
first became aware that the December 11,1990 order had been signed 
and entered.1 Counsel then filed a motion with the district court 
asking the trial court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the 
order or to vacate the order. (Exhibit I, Appendix.) 
The memorandum filed with the motion, pursuant to Rule 4-
501 (Exhibit J, Appendix), argued procedural irregularities as a 
basis for the relief sought by the DeBrys. 
The issue of procedural irregularities was again raised 
in the reply memorandum filed in the trial court. (Exhibit K, 
Appendix.) 
At oral argument on the motion, the court was informed 
that a filing error had denied to counsel notice that Fidelity had 
^hile it is true a copy of the proposed December 11, 1990 
order was mailed to counsel on November 16, 1990, a filing mistake 
at counsel's office resulted in counsel not seeing the proposed 
order prior to filing and counsel was never aware the order was 
proposed or signed. (See Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Ex. G.) 
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submitted the December 11 order for signature by the court. See. 
Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, at para. 5(a). 
Counsel argued to the trial court at oral argument that 
had Fidelity followed Rules 4-501 and 4-504 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, at least three separate notices would have 
come to plaintiff and the filing error would not have denied the 
DeBrys the notice necessary to protect their rights to appeal the 
December 11, 1990 order. Id. at para. 5(d). 
Because counsel was unaware the December 11, 1990 order 
was entered, no new notice of appeal was filed. The failure to 
file a new notice resulted in dismissal of the original appeal 
(Case No. 910329-CA) for lack of jurisdiction. (Exhibit L.) 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS BASED UPON THE ERRONEOUS 
ASSUMPTION THAT FIDELITY'S PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS 
WERE WAIVED BY APPELLANT 
This court granted summary disposition based upon an 
erroneous assumption that the DeBrys had waived Fidelity's 
procedural defects by not raising them in the trial court. The 
court stated: 
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated 
seven procedural rules in obtaining the 
December 11, 1990 order. However, on November 
16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel a 
copy of the proposed order denying appellants' 
objections and additions to proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants 
did not object to the proposed order and did 
4 
not raise any of the alleged procedural 
irregularities. In addition, appellants' 
motion to amend the December 11 order did not 
mention any of the asserted irregularities but 
merely sought to delete references to Rule 
52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants 
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity 
committed procedural violations in obtaining 
the December 11 order. 
Slip Opinion at 2, Exhibit M, Appendix. 
The foundation of this Court's opinion (Exhibit M) 
granting dismissal consists of two assumptions. They are: 
1) The DeBrys had notice of the proposed December 11, 
1990 order and did not object to its entry; and 
2) The procedural irregularities surrounding entry of 
the December 11, 1990 order were not raised by 
counsel in his motion to amend or vacate the 
December 11, 1990 order and were not brought to the 
attention of the trial court. 
See, Slip Opinion at 2. 
Both of these assumptions are erroneous. Counsel's 
motion to alter or vacate the December 11, 1990 order was supported 
by a memorandum (Exhibit J) which expressly raised the procedural 
irregularities. See, pp. 4-5, Exhibit J. The reply memorandum 
again raised the issue of procedural irregularities. See, Exhibit 
K, pp. 4-5. 
The fact that counsel was unaware of the proposed 
December 11, 1990 order due to a filing error was also raised at 
5 
oral argument on the motions. See. Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, 
Exhibit G at para. 5-7. 
Thus, this court's assumption that counsel for the DeBrys 
knowingly failed to object to the proposed order of December 11 and 
waived Fidelity's procedural errors, has no basis in the record. 
The record shows the opposite to be true. 
Rehearing should be granted because this court's decision 
was based on an erroneous assumption that the DeBrys had waived 
Fidelity's procedural misconduct. 
VI. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing is filed in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
DATED this /—^ day of July, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, (DeBry v. Fidelity) were mailed, 
postage prepaid, on the /-^ day of July, 1992, to the following: 
Lynn McMurray 
455 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SP3J-039/jn 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY 
Plaintiff, 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. al., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual 
et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company ("Fidelity") for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert 
and Joan DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") came on for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 28, 1990, at of 1:00 
-1-
FILE CQP)' 
p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding. 
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates. Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale 
and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to 
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully 
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased 
from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was 
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed 
is referred to herein as the "Property"). 
2. While the Building was still under construction, 
DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale. 
3. DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title & Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the 
"Closing"). At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of 
closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents"). 
4. One of the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and 
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Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated 
December 13, 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
and made a part hereof) . Line 48 of the Closing Statement provided 
for payment of $79,247.16 to be made to Cascade at the Closing. 
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an 
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on 
the Building (the "Subcontractors"). The Closing Statement 
specifically stated: 
The undersigned Buyer [DeBrys] and Seller 
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing 
statement and authorize Utah Title & Abstract 
Company, to complete the transaction in 
accordance herewith. All instruments may 
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed, 
[emphasis added]. 
5. Pursuant to DeBrys1 and Cascadefs Closing Statement, 
Utah Title disbursed the $14 3,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but 
only $57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $21,923.82 was 
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property 
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization. These amounts 
were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-Woodbury"). 
6. As a further part of the Closing, DeBrys also 
executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust deed on the 
Property in the amount of $62,500.00, representing the balance of 
the purchase price for the Building and Property to be paid by 
-3-
DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The 
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written 
Closing Statement at line 7. 
7 • DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and 
Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded. 
8. In connection with the Closing, DeBry, Cascade, and 
Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger 
Agreement" (DeBrys1 Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted by 
counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part 
hereof). Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work 
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and 
although "various issues concerning the construction remain 
unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement 
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily 
supplied by Seller." 
9. DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys1 Escrow 
Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed would be escrowed with Utah 
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the 
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for 
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues. DeBrys1 Escrow 
Agreement specifically provided 
that the amount of increase in allowances, 
the decrease in the charge of any extras, the 
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increase in any credits, and the amount paid 
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is 
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic,1 
to perform which the parties agree to or which 
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are 
entitled to, shall be deducted from the 
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note 
rthe Note! and Trust Deed, Until the disputes 
which exists Tsic.] concerning allowances, 
extras, credits and unfinished work are 
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise, 
Buyers may also deduct all funds owed it 
f sic.] under the warranty described in 
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for work-
manship and materials] and Seller's obli-
gation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's 
indemnification against mechanic's liens] 
from the amounts owed under the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added]. 
10. By letter dated December 16, 1985 (three days 
after the date of the signed Closing Statement), Mr. Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury ("Woodbury"), attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written 
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury 
(the "Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof). Richards-
Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property 
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds on the 
title" of the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a 
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was 
expressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions 
to use Richards-Woodbury's loan proceeds to clear those 
encumbrances and "clouds on title." 
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11. The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further 
stated: 
After you have determined that all the liens 
and clouds on the property [the Property] 
have been satisfied and removed and that the 
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above 
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing 
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be 
a first lien, vou may disburse the remaining 
funds from the check described in paragraph 
8. above [the $485,973.35 check representing 
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodbury•s 
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises 
[emphasis added]. 
In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury 
did not intend by the words "clouds on the property11 to refer to 
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license or building 
permit to construct the Building. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having or not 
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically 
did not refer to any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title. 
12. DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and others 
for the alleged faulty construction of the Building. DeBrys named 
Utah Title as one of many defendants and asserted the following 
claims against Utah Title: 
a. That Cascade did not have a contractor's 
license or building permit to construct the Building. DeBrys 
claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the 
Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, 
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that 
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized 
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should not have disbursed to 
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and 
building permit. 
b. That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse 
any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
c. That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for 
allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not 
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
13. Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended 
their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their 
Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this 
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter of 
Utah Title for the purpose of issuing title policies, and that 
pursuant to §31A-23-308, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), Fidelity is 
liable for Utah Title's alleged misconduct. §31A-23-308 states, in 
relevant part: 
Any title company represented by one or more 
title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to others dealing with the 
title insurance agents for the receipt and 
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disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all those transactions 
where a commitment or binder for or policy 
or contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance 
company has been issued or distributed. 
14. After Fidelity was brought into this action as a 
party Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 
proceeding is still pending. 
15. Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. The DeBrys were 
also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some 
of the Closing Documents, including DeBry!s Escrow Agreement. 
16. Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, the 
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. Any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade did not create a cloud on the title to the 
Property. 
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2. Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah 
Title to determine whether Cascade had a contractor's license or a 
building permit. 
3. There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents, 
including without limitation in the Closing Statement or DeBrys1 
Escrow Agreement. If there were any ambiguities in DeBrys1 Escrow 
Agreement,' they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the 
document. 
4. The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with 
respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified, 
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents 
themselves without the need for any parol evidence. 
5. The Closing Documents authorized immediate 
disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the 
Closing Statement) and the balance owing to Seller (line 48 of the 
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys. The oral 
agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written 
Closing . Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the 
introduction of any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements. 
6. The December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury Escrow 
Instructions were intended to protect someone other than DeBrys. 
DeBrys are not third-party beneficiaries of the December 16, 1985 
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to 
-9-
assert any alleged violation of those instructions* 
7. There was no violation of the Closing Documents by 
Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah 
Title in connection with the Closing. 
8. Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under §31A-23-308, 
Utah Code Annotated. Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to 
DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement 
regarding the Property. 
9. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law, 
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeBrys should be 
granted. 
10. As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is 
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor. 
Dated this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
-10-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
/ 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this 2j£ daY o f April, 1990, 
to: 
Edward T. Wells 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, 
this day of April, 1990 to: 
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
#185 So. State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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-12-
EXHIBIT B 
CSRTITIC&TZ 0? SMTP-PELTIER Y 
I hereby certify thar a true and correct copy of 
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Edvard T. Weils 
4252 Sou-h 700 East 
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S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 54111 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del 3artel 
?. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thrugood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Del 3artel 
?. 0. 3cx 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dale Thurgocd 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lee Allen Barrel 
110 Merrinac Court 
Vallejo, California 94859 
Stanley Postma 
2 571 South 7 5 West 
3cuntifui, Utah 8 4 010 
Richard Cariing 
SHEXRES. i CABLING 
200 South Main Street, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
Glen Roberts 
WOCZ-3URY, EETTILYCN & KESLER 
2 577 Parley's VTay 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 109 
Paul Maughan 
SALT. LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COKNE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South, ^1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Re., F600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Craig Peterson 
LITTLEEIELD « PETERSON 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Van Ellsworth 
1414 Laburnun Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
5 05 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah S4 01C 
Darvin C. Hansen 
MORGAN « HANSEN 
13 6 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
EXHIBIT C 
' • » / 
Robert J. Daler No. 0808 
Lynn c. McMurray, No.' 2213 
Attorneys for Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Company and 
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
Canada Life Assurance Ccapany 
455 East 500 South, Suite*3 00 
Salt LaXe City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (8 01) 532-5125 
..:.' / 
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z- '•' ;** 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL" DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DE3RY AND JOAN DE3RY 
P l a i n t i f f 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. al., 
Defendants, 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
vs. 
D^ERY, an individual 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIA 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Civil No, C56-553 
Judce Paz 5. Brian 
The Morion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company ("Fidelity") for Surmary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert 
and Jean DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") cane en for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 22, 1590, at cf 1:00 
p.a.
 r the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding. 
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeEry « 
Associates. Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale 
and Lynn C. McMurray of Mcliurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
considered the memoranda submitted in suppcrt of and opposition to 
the notion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully 
and duly inferred in the premises, the Court now enters the 
following: 
rrypiNGs o? UNDISPUTED HATSRTAL TACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased 
from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was 
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed 
is referred to herein as the "Property"). 
2. While the Building was still under construction, 
DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale. 
2. DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title £ Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the 
"Closing") . At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of 
closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents"). 
4. One cf the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and 
Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated 
December 13; 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit X 
and made a part hereof) . Line 4 3 of the Closing Statement provided 
for payment of $79,247.16 to is made to Cascade at the Closing. 
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an 
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked en 
the Building (the "Subcontractors") . The Closing Statement 
specifically stated: 
The undersigned 3uyer [DeBrys] and Seller 
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing 
statement ana authorize Utah Title « Abstract 
Company, to complete the transaction in 
accordance herewith. All instruments mav 
be delivered cr recorded and funds disbursed. 
[emphas is added]. 
5. Pursuant to DeBrys1 and Cascade's Closing Statement, 
Utah Title disbursed the $143,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but 
only S57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $T1,923.S2 was 
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property 
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization. These amounts 
were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Ccrpcration ("Richards -Woodbury") . 
6. As a further part cf the Closing, DeBrys also 
executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust dee,i en the 
Property in the amount cf $52,500.00, representing the balance cf 
the murchase price for the 3uildinc and Prcpertv to be taid by 
<\ r,Qc-c 
increase in any credits; and the amount paid 
by'Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is 
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic.1 
to perform which the parties agree to cr which 
a Court or other authority orders Buyers are 
entitled to, shall be deducted from the 
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note 
rthe Notel and Trust Deed. Until the disputes 
which exists rsic.1 concerning allowances, 
extras, credits and unfinished work are 
resolved either by Agreement cr otherwise, 
3uvers mav also deduct all funds owed -it 
rsic. ] under the warranty described in 
paragraph 2 [Cascaded warranty for work-
manship and materials] and Seller's obli-
gation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's 
indennificaticn against mechanic's liens] 
from the amounts owed under the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added]. 
10. By letter dated December 16, IS£5 (three days 
after the came of the signed Closing Statement) , Mr. Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , attorney fcr Richards-Woodbury, gave written 
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury 
(the "Pochards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;n a copy cf which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof) . Richards-
Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property 
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds en the 
title" cf the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a 
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was 
e>:pressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions 
to use Richarcs-Wocdbury' s loan proceeds to clear those 
encumbrances and "clouds en title." 
11 • The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further 
stated: 
After you have determined that all the liens 
and clouds on the orooertv [the Property] 
have been satisfied and removed and that the 
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above 
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing 
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be 
a first lien, vou nsv disburse the remaininc 
• funds fror. the check described in oaracranh 
S. above [the 5485,973.25 check representing 
the total loan proceeds frcn ?.ichards-Woodbury' s 
lean to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises 
[enphas is added]• 
In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury 
did not intend by the words "clouds en the property" to refer to 
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license cr building 
permit to construct the Building. Koreoever, the Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having cr net 
having a contractor's license cr building permit, and specifically 
did net refer to any lack cf a contractor's license cr building 
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title. 
12. DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and ethers 
for the alleged faulty construction cf the Building. DeErys naned 
Utah Title as one cf nany defendants and asserted the following 
ciair.s against Utah Title: 
a. That Cascade did not have a contractor's 
license cr build* nc ce^t^t to const*^ uct the Build inc. DeBrvs 
ciair.ee that this constituted a "cloud" en the title cf the 
J.*JO .J*-> 
Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, 
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that 
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized 
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should net have disbursed to 
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor f s license and 
building permit. 
b. That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse 
any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
c. That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys fcr 
allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not 
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
13. Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended 
their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their 
Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this 
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter cf 
Utah Title for the purpose cf issuing title policies, and that 
pursuant to S21A-23-30S, Utah Code Annotated (UCA) , Fidelity is 
liable for Utah Title1s alleged misconduct. §31A-23-30S states, in 
relevant tarti 
Any title company represented by one cr more 
title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to ctners dealing with the 
title insurance acents fcr the receipt and 
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all these transactions 
where a commitment or binder for or policy 
or contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance 
company has been issued or distributed. 
14 . After Fidelity was brought into this action as a 
parry Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 BarJiruptcy 
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 
proceeding is still pending. 
15. Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. The De3rys were 
also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some 
cf the Closing Documents, including De3ryfs Escrow Agreement. 
15. Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action. 
CCKCLCSIONS OF LA~ 
Based en the foregoing undisputed material facts, 
Court hereby enters the following conclusions cf law: 
1. Any lack cf a contractor's license cr building 
permit by Cascade did net create a cloud en the title to the 
Prcoertv. 
2. Neither the December 16, 19 85 Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required DtcLh 
Title to determine vhether Cascade had a contractor's license or a 
building permit. 
3. There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents, 
including without limitation i: the Closing Statement cr DeBrys• 
Escrow Agreement. If there were any ambiguities in De3rysf Escrow 
Agreement:, they would be construed against DeErys, who prepared the 
document. 
4. The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with 
respect to line 44 cf the Closing Statement is easily clarified, 
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents 
themselves without the need for any parol evidence. 
5. The Closing Documents authorized immediate 
disbursement of the amounts cue Subcontractors (line 44 of the 
Closing Statement) and "he balance owing :o Seller (line 4S of the 
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys. The oral 
agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written 
Closing Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the 
introduction cf any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements. 
6. The December 15, 19S5 Richards-Wcodbury Escrow 
Instructions were intended to protect someone ether than DeBrys. 
DeBrys are net third-party beneficiaries cf the December 15, 19E5 
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to 
assert any alleged violation cf those instructions. 
7. There was no violation of the Closing Documents by 
Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah 
Title in connection with the Closing. 
8. Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under S31A-22-308, 
Utah Code Annotated. Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to 
DeHrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement 
regarding the Property. 
S. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeHrys as a matter of law, 
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeHrys should be 
granted. 
10. As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules cf Civil 
Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is 
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor. 
s\ 
Dated t h i s , ' day cf •/. / - /• 19S0, 
— — •.•-—» W W W • « _ • 
I 
rzz. c. Brian -
District Court Judce 
-J n. 
EXHIBIT D 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East . 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., | 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS 
AND ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS Or FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. C86-553 
) JUDGE PAT S. BRIAN 
Plaintiffs submit. the following objections and 
additions to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted bv defendant Ficelitv National Title Insurance Comoanv. 
GENERAL OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS Or FACT 
Findings of fact are unnecessary to support the 
granting of summary judgment. Mountain States v. Atkin, Orient £ 
: ^ T o ^ — 
Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. All that is required in this case is 
that the court enter an order declaring its findings that because 
it holds as a matter of law there were no disputed facts on 
material issues, judgment was rendered for defendant. 
'There is an extensive record in this case. As long as 
the argument and issues have been raised before this Court, the 
plaintiffs should be allowed, on appeal, to use any portion of 
the record which supports their position. 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS Or FACT 
Without waiving the C4eneral Objection just mentioned, 
the plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact. 3y making these specific objections, 
the plaintiffs do not intend to resubmit or reargue their 
exposition to Fidelity's Motion. The plaintiffs do, however, 
want to identify these issues which they contend are not properly 
submitted as findings and/cr are disputed in the record. 
1. Regarding • finding number 1, the plaintiffs object 
to the language "under construction" on the third line. The fact 
is the building was represented to be substantially completed and 
a temporary certificate of occupancy was produced at closing to 
support the claim that with the exception of a few minor items 
set forth on said certificate, the building was completed. 
Plaintiffs never intended and did not believe they were buying a 
building which was -under construction." 
2. With respect to finding number 2, the comments to 
number 1 above would apply. 
3. With respect to finding number 4, plaintiffs 
object to the characterization by defendant as to what the 
closing statement says. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the 
language must be read together with the language requiring 
approval-of plaintiffs of any dispersals. The specific language 
quoted is subject to the approval requirement. 
4. Plaintiffs object to finding number 5 on the 
grounds the court made no findings at the hearing regarding the 
manner or method of disbursement. 
5. With respect to paragraph 8, plaintiffs object to 
the characterization of the escrow agreements' meaning. The 
court, made no findings thereon and the document speaks for 
itself. 
6. With respect to paragraph 10, plaintiffs object to 
the characterization cf the letter which speaks for itself. 
Furthermore, the loan proceeds at that point belonged to DeErys 
and such finding should be noted. 
7. There is a disputed fact issue as to the aliened 
intent of the Woodbury escrow instructions which should be noted 
in the findings• 
8. With respect to paragraph 12(b), it was and is the 
position of plaintiffs that the agreement not to disperse was 
both oral and in writing and the writing is evidenced by the 
language of the closing statement. 
9. With respect to paragraph 12(c), the language 
should show that plaintiffs' claims included the negligent 
disbursal cf the escrowed monies. 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The proposed Conclusions of Law contain unnecessary and 
inappropriate restatement: of the facts upon which the Conclusions 
are based. Conclusions of law should simply set forth the 
position cf the Court as to the law applicable to the facts of 
the case. 
1. Conclusions cf law numbered 3 and 4 are nixed 
conclusions. The lecal conclusion is "the content is not 
ambicuous." 
.A r* *~\' 
2. A specific finding should be included holding that 
S 31A-23-308 does not apply to losses caused by negligence as 
this finding was specifically made by the Court. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attornevs for Plaintiffs 
EDWARD WELLS 
EXHIBIT E 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A34 22 
ROBERT 0. DE3RY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South TOO East 
Sail Lake City, UT 84 107 
Telephone: (801) 252-SS15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAK1 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC: 
: COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT.J. DEBRY and JOAN DESRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
1KSUHAMCS CO. , s- &i. , 
Defendants. 
Notice is herebv civen 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil Nc. ce5-533 
JUDGE PAT E. BRIAN 
- Robert J. DeBry and Joan, 
tiffs herein najnec, hereby appeal to the Supreme 
j - ; - ; ^^ Utah ~""cm the crier of the District Cou**-
cra.-.cinc su-miary jurig;ne::t in favor of Fidelity National Title 
iir.ai order oursuar.c to P.uie 54(b) cf tiie 
Civil Procedure on *i=y 2, 1??0. 
A-Z^l cav of Kay, 1S20. 
Del-
Ccu 
s c r^  -
' *
 ,r,r*-^ - ' 
.s I^LAJ} 
-ticns'^s L ^  _ r i -> ; ^ - ; r s 
o 
r ii P n D v 
CERTIFICATE Or MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoina 
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al. ) was mailed, on the 
*^2^?__ cay of May, 1990, to the following: 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P.O. Bex 7234 
Hurray, UT 84 107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Del Bartel 
P.O. Box 7 2 34 
Murray, UT • 84 107 
Dale Thurgood 
4 4 55 South 7 00 East =3 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 107 
>o n I - * — ©i e *--jLJ.en ~artei 
110 Kerrirnac Csurr 
Vaiiejo, CA 945c3 
Glen P.cherts 
2 5 7 7 Parley's W ay 
Salt Lake Citv UT 8-10 9 
S t a n 1 e v Pes t r* a 
2571 Suuth 73 west 
B o u r. t i f u 1 U T £ - C " Q 
Lvnn W C W M — ~v 
435 East 500*South #30 
Salt Lake Cily, UT 84111 
\j •* 
Robert Huches 
50 West 300 South #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #500 
Salt Lake City,-UT 64105 
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Has 1am 
185 South State #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
D» Michael Nielsen 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 64010 
Darwin C. Hansen 
13 5 South Main, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT* 64101 
Craic Peterson 
425 South 500 East 
C .2 " — r s i- » r ; ••• Ttrri C > ^  O *} 
Van Ellsworth 
14 14 Laburnum Street 
r^ en cartel 
12133 Clay Star Rd 
Herald, CA 9 3538 
•> 
EXHIBIT F 
W - w I 
Lynn C. McMurray, #2213 
McKURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE £ PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
ROBERT J. DE3RY AND JOAN DE5RY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. al.f 
Defendants. 
CAJ 
vs. 
,IFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
^ 1
 ?.' r,4-,' x^: 
jisAi , an mcivicua. 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF !S 
OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO 
AMEND PROPOSED FINDINGS CF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C36-553 
Judce Pat E. Brian 
Undisputed Material Facts and Conclusions of Lav on Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Company's Kotion for Summary Judgment) 
and its Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fidelity.. National 
Title Insurance Company Against Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and 
Joan De3ry. Thereafter, on May 4, 1990, Plaintiff submitted 
Plaintiff's Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Lav. No party having requested era! argument, 
and the Court being fully and duly informed in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 motion pursuant to 
Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 10 amend the proposed 
Findings cf Fact and Conclusions ,tf* JLaw be and is herebv denied. 
DATED this // day oSvKc^enber, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
Attcrnevs for Defendant: 
cr?' -r- nr err' 
I hereby certify that Z mailed a copy cf the foregoing Orde: 
Denying Plaintiff's Objections and Kotion to Amend Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions cf Lav, first-c^ass postage 
therecn fully prepaid this 11/°^ dav cf November, 199 0, to: 
r
::=oHH.c?:D/Lr«/e 
Thcnas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
#165 So. State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City,-UT - 84111 
Curtis Z. Drake 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, KILLER & 
NELSON 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake'City, UT 84110 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del 3artel 
P. O. 3ox 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Paul Maughan 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, £300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT k SEGAL 
P. O. Bex 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah S41-.7 
Del Bartel 
P. O. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South, F'1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dale Thurgood 
4 4 55 South 7 00 East, #3 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd., £600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrimac Court 
Vallejc, California 94859 
Craig Peterson 
LITTLEEIELD « PETERSON 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stanley Pcstr.a 
2571 South 75 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
Van Ellsworth 
1414'Laburnum Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
Richard Carling 
2650 Beneficial Life Tower 
26 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 111 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
5C5 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Glen Roberts 
WOODBURY, BETTILYCN « KESLER 
2677 Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Darwin C. Hansen 
MORGAN « HANSEN 
13 6 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DeBRY * ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah S41C7 
o ^ 
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EXHIBIT G 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellants 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ; 
vs. 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INS.C CO. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
) EDWARD T. WELLS 
i Case No. 920269-CA 
i Category 16 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Edward T. Wells, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel of record for appellants herein. 
2. The copy of the December 11, 1990 order signed by the 
trial court in this case which was mailed to my office by counsel 
for Fidelity National Insurance Company ("Fidelity") was mistakenly 
filed without my having seen the proposed order. 
3. When I became aware of the order as a result of 
appellees' brief, I filed a motion to vacate the order or to amend 
out references to Rule 52(b). 
4. My memorandum in support of the motion specifically 
raised Fidelity's procedural violations as a reason for my failure 
to become aware of the position of Fidelity that my Rule 4-504 
objections might be considered to be a Rule 52(b) motion. 
5. At oral argument before Judge Brian I argued: 
a) That a filing mistake had denied to me actual 
notice of the proposed December 11, 1990 order; 
b) That Fidelity had violated numerous procedural 
rules"in submitting the December 11, 1990 order; 
c) That had* ^ Fidelity followed procedural rules, I 
would have received additional notices and become 
aware there was an issue regarding whether the 
objections I had filed to the form of the May 2, 
1990 order was a Rule 52(b) motion; and 
d) That had I received the three notices contemplated 
by Rules 4-501 and 4-504, I could have either 
properly responded to the proposed order or filed a 
new notice of appeal and the original case could 
have been heard on its merits. 
6. No party to this appeal has ever asserted that the DeBrys 
failed to raise Fidelity's procedural errors in the lower court. 
2 
7. I have discussed this issue with counsel for Fidelity and 
he agrees that the issue of Fidelity's alleged procedural omissions 
and errors was argued to Judge Brian. 
DATED this / -^ day of July, 1992. 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
•4 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this *7 day of 
, 1992. 
My Commission Expires: 
RESIDING IN: 
JANR1R1E 
mztHBUC'Smzeim 
c'oR06EHTJ.DeBRV4ASSOC 
4252 SOUTH 700 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84107 
COMM. EXP. 0641-95 
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EXHIBIT H 
subjects addressed in the parol agreements. A finding of 
integration is, nonetheless, implicit in the trial court's 
Findings of Fact. 
5. Fidelity is not liable under 531A-23-308 for Utah 
Title's alleged negligent misrepresentation tort. 
That statute contains absolutely no language making an 
underwriter liable for the torts of its title insurance agents. 
DeBrys1 common law agency argument against Fidelity in its brief 
was not pleaded or argued below, is not supported in the record, 
is being raised for the first time on appeal, and is the subject 
of a totally separate lawsuit filed by DeBrys. Moreover, 
negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on an alleged 
misrepresentation of a "future event," as opposed to a 
representation of an existing material fact. 
IX • ARGUMENT 
1. THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Two days after the Court below entered Summary Judgment in 
favor of Fidelity, DeBrys filed a motion to amend and make 
additions to the findings of fact. Before the district court 
entered its order denying their motion, DeBrys filed their only 
notice of appeal ever filed. Under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, DeBrys' notice of appeal has no effect: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court 
by any party . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new 
trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion . . . A notice of appeal filed before 
the disposition of any [such motion] shall 
have no effect, A new notice of appeal must 
be filed within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order of the trial 
1 7 
court disposing of the motion as provided 
above [emphasis added]. 
On December 11, 1990, the trial court denied DeBrys' motion 
in an order stating as follows in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion 
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law be and is hereby 
denied. (R. 12917; App. Z). 
The 30 day period for filing DeBrys1 Notice of Appeal thus began 
to run on December 11, 1990, and DeBrys1 prior May 22, 1990 
Notice of Appeal therefore was filed prematurely and was totally 
ineffective. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in Transamerica 
Cash Reserve> Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986) , that a 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-judgment 
motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme 
Court. Also, in Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P. 2d 999 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) , this Court held that a post-judgment motion like this 
suspends the finality of the judgment, and that a notice of 
appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion by entry 
of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an 
appellate court. Because DeBrys filed their notice of appeal 
before obtaining a ruling on their proposed additions to the 
findings of fact, their notice of appeal was ineffective to 
confer jurisdiction on this Court, and this appeal therefore 
should be dismissed. 
2. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW ONLY THOSE CLAIMS RAISED IN DEBRYS1 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IGNORE THOSE ISSUES NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE IT. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
i Civil No. C86-553 
| JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60
 f Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, plaintiff moves the court for an order amending 
the court's order denying Plaintiff's Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which order was signed 
December 11, 1990. 
Plaintiff seeks amendment of the order to delete 
references to a Rule 52(b) motion because no such motion was ever 
1 T/i97 
filed. The order should reflect only that objections to the 
"proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" were denied and 
that the court entered the proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as submitted by counsel for defendant Fidelity. 
Plaintiff requests oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-
501(3)(b) and 4-501(4). 
DATED this yS/ day of September, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
13428 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. ] 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., j 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., ] 
Defendant. ] 
i MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
i MOTION TO AMEND ORDER 
i Civil No. C86-553 
i JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1) (a), plaintiffs file this 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Order, 
BACKGROUND 
On March 28, 1990 the court heard and granted the motion 
of Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (hereinafter 
"Fidelity") for summary judgment. Following this hearing, counsel 
for Fidelity submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to the court along with a proposed judgment. 
Prior to becoming aware that the court had signed and 
entered the proposed findings and conclusions plaintiffs1 counsel 
filed plaintiffs1 objections ana additions to proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, See, Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, 
attached as Exhibit A. 
Upon receiving notice the court had signed the findings 
and judgment, plaintiffs1 counsel assumed the objections were 
overruled by the court and notice of appeal was then timely filed. 
Counsel for Fidelity never filed a response to plaintiffs1 
objections. 
On November 16, 1990, counsel for Fidelity filed a 
document entitled order denying plaintiffs1 objections and motion 
to amend proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This 
document was signed by the court December 11, 1990. The said order 
provides: 
Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 52(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law be and hereby is denied. 
Defendant Fidelity now seeks dismissal of plaintiffs' 
appeal at the court of appeals on the ground the notice of appeal 
was not filed after denial of a Rule 52(b) motion to amend the 
judgment. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to vacate or 
amend the order to delete references to a Rule 52(b) motion because 
no such motion was ever filed. 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR MOTION 
This matter is presently before the Utah Court of Appeals 
on the appeal by plaintiff of this court's order granting summary 
judgment to Fidelity. 
In Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 
1988) . The Utah Court of Appeals held that a Rule 60 motion may be 
considered by the trial court while the appeal is pending. 
ARGUMENT 
This court should amend the order entered December 11, 
1990 to remove the language relating to Rule 52(b) for the 
following reasons: 
1. Plaintiff did not File a Rule 52(b) Motion. 
The order purports to deny a Rule 52(b) motion allegedly 
filed by plaintiffs. No such motion was ever filed. The pleading 
filed clearly states it is "objections and additions to proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law" (emphasis added) . Rule 4-
504 clearly allows such a filing. The pleading is not labeled as 
a motion. Rule 52(b) is nowhere mentioned. At the time of filing, 
3 
counsel for plaintiff was not aware judgment had been signed and 
was attempting to object under Rule 4-504. See, Exhibit A. 
Thus, it is clear there was no Rule 52(b) motion. 
2. If Plaintifffs objections are in fact construed by the 
court to be a Rule 52 fb) motion,. then the order 
complained of was entered in violation of procedural 
rules. 
If, notwithstanding the argument in Section 1, above, the 
court construes plaintiff's objections to be a Rule 52(b) motion, 
then the order of December 11, 1990 was entered in violation of the 
procedural mandate of Rule 4-501(1) of the Civil Rules of Practice. 
If, for the sake of argument, we assume the objections were in fact 
a Rule 52(b) motion, then before the motion could be lawfully 
submitted to the court for signing, the provisions of Rule 4-501(1) 
would need to be followed. Rule 4-501(1) (d) is explicit and 
mandatory. Before a motion can be submitted to the court for 
decision a separate written pleading captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision" with a certificate showing mailing to all parties 
must be filed. The rule is explicit "if neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision." 
There was never a notice to submit for decision filed by 
defendant Fidelity. In fact, under Rule 4-501(b), Fidelity's 
failure to file a response to the alleged Rule 52(b) motion 
precludes them from submitting the matter for decision. If a 
memorandum in opposition is not filed, rule 4-501(1)(b) provides 
4 
for submission for decision under Rule 4-501(1) (d) only by the 
T^ vvipg party. 
Since the procedure necessary to file and submit a motion 
for decision was clearly not followed and in fact Rule 4-501 (d) was 
violated by Fidelity in submitting the order for signature, the 
court should either: 
a) vacate the order and sign an amended order deleting 
references to Rule 52(b) and clearly stating that 
objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or 
b) vacate the December 11, 1990 Order and require Rule 
4-501 to be followed prior to entry of a new order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the court should grant 
the motion of plaintiff and either: 
a) vacate the order and enter a new order deleting 
references to Rule 52(b) and clearly stating 
objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or 
b) vacate the order and require compliance with Rule 
4-501(1). . 
DATED this day of September, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
" EDWARD T. WELLS " 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, | 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ; 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. ] 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. ] 
AFFIDAVIT 
I WELLS 
i Civil No. 
i JUDGE PAT 
OF EDWARD T. 
C86-553 
B. BRIAN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Edward T. Wells, being duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for plaintiff in reference to matters 
related to defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance (hereinafter 
"Fidelity"). 
2. On or before May 4, 1990, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Practice, I prepared Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which had been proposed by 
counsel for Fidelity as part of an order granting summary judgment. 
3. I signed the objections on May 4, 1991. 
4. At the time the objections were prepared and signed, 
I was not aware the judgment had been signed. 
5. There was no mention of Rule 52(b) in the objections 
filed and I had no intent to involve Rule 52(b) because I was not 
aware a judgment had been entered. 
6. No Rule 52(b) motion has ever been filed by 
plaintiff regarding the Fidelity judgment. 
7. I have never received a pleading from Fidelityfs 
counsel which purported to respond to my objections or to be a 
memorandum in opposition to a Rule 52(b) motion. 
8. I have never received from counsel for Fidelity a 
notice to submit a Rule 52(b) motion for decision. 
9. I have never received from anyone a notice to submit 
for decision under Rule 4-501(1) (d) with respect to the objections 
to proposed findings signed by me on May 4, 1990. 
10. I have never filed a notice to submit such 
objections for decision. 
2 
DATED th u n 
y(L 
day of September, 1991, 
•" EDWARD T. WELLS 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this JJH day of 
res: 
NOTARY PUBLIC /? / 
RESIDING IN: K^/JCLLJ/~ fZ^pJ'J 
I 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., ) 
Defendants. ; 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN 
| OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
) AMEND ORDER 
) CASE NO. C83-553 
I JUDGE PAT BRIAN 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Fidelity has not disputed any of the facts set out 
in the memorandum of plaintiff in support of the motion to amend 
the order centered herein December 11, 1990. Therefore, they are 
accepted as true. Defendants have not contested the statements 
contained in the affidavit filed in support of the motion. 
Plaintiff disputes the characterization of "facts" contained 
in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows: 
a) The objections to proposed findings were mooted when the 
court entered the judgment. No formal order was needed. 
b) Defendant's characterization of a "loose end" remaining 
is spurious. No motion was pending. The court had not 
been asked to do anything to the judgment entered on May 
2, 1990. The letters referred to (Exhibit C & D) were 
not delivered to counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for defendants have cited to the court no legal 
authority and have filed no affidavits to support their position. 
The entire basis for the language which is objected to in the 
December 11, 1990 order is defense counsel's "characterization" of 
plaintiff's objections to the proposed findings as a Rule 52(b) 
motion. 
A motion is defined in law as an application to a court for an 
order. E.g. . Wolff v. Wolff. 25 Or. App. 739, 550 P.2d 1388 
(1976); Iverson v. Second Judicial District Court, 66 Nev. 145, 206 
P.2d 755 (1949); Williams v. Denning. 260 N.C. 539, 133 S.E.2d 150, 
151 (1963); Schoenberg v. Benner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 359, 367 (Cal. App. 
1967); Behm v. Division of Administration, 275 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. 
2 
App. 1973); State v. James, 347 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Mo. 1961); Elliot 
v. Elliot, 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 1990); People v. Thomas, 
34 111. App.3d 1002, 341 N.E.2d 178, 182 (1976); see. Black's Law 
Dictionary at 1164 (4th ed. 1951). 
Counsel cannot convert objections to proposed findings into a 
Rule 52(b) motion merely because part of the "objections" was a 
suggestion additional findings were needed. Rule 52(b) is nowhere 
mentioned in the pleading filed by plaintiff. Plaintiff asked for 
no relief at all, let alone Rule 52(b) relief. No order or other 
type of relief is sought. There is no suggestion any order be 
amended. The pleading is simply and by definition not a motion. 
Id. Contrary to the argument of defendant the pleading 
"substantially" cannot be a motion because it seeks no relief and 
asks for no order. .Id. Thus, the language in the December 11 
order is not only baseless, but it mischaracterizes the pleading as 
a matter of law. On its face the pleading is an objection to 
proposed findings. Defendants cite not one case to support their 
position. The cases cited herein by plaintiff defining a "motion" 
are representative of the general rule. 
Since no Rule 52(b) motion was filed, the questioned language 
should be stricken because a court cannot deny a non-existent 
motion. 
3 
POINT II 
THE MANNER OF ENTERING THE ORDER WAS 
PROCEDURALLY IRREGULAR 
Notwithstanding defendants' argument to the contrary, the 
entry of the December 11, 1990 order was procedurally irregular and 
improper. 
Simply stated, the procedure under Rule 4-501 is as follows: 
1. A motion is filed and a supporting memorandum must 
accompany the motion unless uncontested or ex parte [(Rule 4-
501(a)] (the fact no memorandum accompanied plaintiff's objections 
argues no motion was intended). 
2. The responding party may file a responsive memorandum 
within ten days. If no memo is filed, the moving party may submit 
for decision. By failing to file a response, the right to submit 
for decision is waived. [Rule 4-501(b)]. 
3. If a responsive memorandum is filed the moving party may 
file a reply within five days. (Rule 4-501(c)]. 
4. Jf. a responsive memo was filed, then five days later, 
whether or not a reply is filed, either party may then file a 
notice to submit for decision [Rule 4-501(d)]. 
The reasons why the December 11, 1990 order was irregular and 
improperly entered are as follows: 
1. A motion was not filed by definition. Elliot v. Elliot, 
supra. 
4 
2. Defendants did not respond pursuant to Rule 4-501(b). 
Thus, Rule 4-501(c) and (d) do not come into play. 
3. Even assuming, arguendo, defendant could properly submit 
the supposed motion for decision, defendant failed to follow the 
requirements of Rule 4-501(d) by filing a notice to submit for 
decision. 
Thus, Rule 4-501 was not properly complied with in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised herein were not before the court when 
the order was signed. The court has signed an order wherein 
defense counsel mischaracterized the matter pending before the 
court. As a matter of law, there was no Rule 52(b) motion and 
therefore, the court must strike from its December 11, 1990 order 
all references to a supposed ruling on a non-existent Rule 52 (b) 
motion. 
DATED this day of /j^C^^/vC^v---, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By: /J&,JL<-< *T7 IMCJXJ 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Robert J. DeBRY and Joan DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
• . 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 910329-CA 
FILED: March 18,1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
ATTORNEYS: 
Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellants 
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and 
Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs, Robert 
J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (DeBrys), against 
defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company (Fidelity). The summary judgment 
was certified by the trial court for appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The underlying action, which inv-
olves multiple parties and multiple causes of 
action,1 stems from DeBrys' purchase of an 
office building. As a threshold matter, Fidelity 
claims that notice of appeal was not timely 
filed, and therefore, this appeal should be 
dismissed. Because timely notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional, Armstrong Rubber Co. v. 
Bastion, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); 
Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 
1983), we must first determine whether 
DeBrys* notice of appeal was timely. 
On March 28, 1990, after DeBrys and Fid-
elity presented oral argument, the trial court 
granted Fidelity's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court directed Fidelity to prepare 
and submit to the court proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in 
conformity with the court's ruling. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
On April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered 
to DeBrys' counsel a copy of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and jud-
gment. All other counsel were served by mail 
on April 25, 1990. After allowing the five-
day objections period to run, as specified in 
ional Title Ins, Co. 
y. Rep. 51 51 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration,2 Fidelity submitted the prop-
osed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment to the trial court on May 2, 1990. 
That same day, the trial court signed and the 
clerk of the court entered the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment. 
On May 7, 1990, five days after entry of 
judgment, DeBrys filed a document entitled 
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law." In the document, DeBrys objected to 
various findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and argued that specific additional findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should be made by 
the trial court. On May 22, 1990, DeBrys filed 
a notice of appeal "from the order ... granting 
summary judgment ... entered ... on May 2, 
1990." 
On November 16, 1990, Fidelity mailed to 
DeBrys' counsel a copy of a proposed order 
denying DeBrys' objections and additions to 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The proposed order characterized 
DeBrys' objections and additions as a motion 
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3 DeBrys did not object to the 
proposed order. Thereafter, on December U, 
1990, the trial court signed the order expressly 
construing DeBrys' objections and additions 
as a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule 
52(b). The court's order, a copy of which had 
been previously mailed to DeBrys' counsel on 
November 16, 1990, stated, "IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs* motion pursuant 
to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law be and is hereby denied." 
DeBrys did not file a notice of appeal after the 
court's December 11, 1990, order, nor did 
they object to the order until some ten months 
later on October 21, 1991, when they filed a 
motion to amend pursuant to Rule 60, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. After oral argument, 
the trial court denied the motion to amend.4 
DeBrys argue that their document concer-
ning objections and additions to proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law was 
not a Rule 52(b) motion and that the trial 
court erred in construing it as such.5 In dete-
rmining whether the court properly characte-
rized DeBrys* document, we look to the doc-
ument's substance rather than its caption. See 
Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-48 (citing Howard 
v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, 356 
P.2d 275, 276 (I960)); GaUardo v. Bolinder, 
800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). 
The court's conclusion that DeBrys' docu-
ment constituted a Rule 52(b) motion is legal 
in nature; thus, it is accorded no particular 
deference and reviewed for correctness. 
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v. 
Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 
1988); but see Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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P.2d 1287, 1288-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) 
(reviewing for "abuse of discretion'' trial 
court's construction of motion to vacate as 
motion to amend under Rule 59(e)). 
DeBrys insist that their document concer-
ning objections and additions to findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should not have 
been construed as a Rule 52(b) motion because 
it did not constitute a "motion" per se.* They 
reason that because their document was an 
objection and not a post-judgment motion, 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) does 
not apply, and that their notice of appeal was 
valid and that hence this court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal.7 
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion 
filed within ten days of the entry of judgment 
that questions the correctness of the court's 
findings and conclusions is properly treated as 
a post-judgment motion under either Rules 
52(b) or 59(e).« Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-
48; GaUardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Vreeken v. 
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Or. 1983). The 
substance of a motion, not its caption, is 
controlling.9 See Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1348; 
GaUardo, 800 P.2d at 817. In the instant case, 
DeBrys* motion in substance requested the 
trial court to amend and make additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a 
request recognized by Rule 52(b). Further-
more, DeBrys' motion was timely inasmuch as 
it was filed five days after entry of judgment.10 
Based on the circumstances and the subst-
ance of DeBrys' motion, the trial court did 
not err in disposing of it as a post-judgment 
motion pursuant to Rule 52(b).11 
Moreover, because the trial court, under 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, can still alter or amend the judg-
ment, amend its findings, or make additional 
findings, a notice of appeal is of no effect if 
filed prior to the disposition of a post-
judgment motion under any of these rules. "A 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon this court." Tran-
samerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); accord 
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); U-M Invs. v. Ray, 
658 P.2d 1186, 1186-87 (Utah 1982) (per 
curiam). Once a timely post-judgment 
motion is made pursuant to one of these rules, 
to permit an appeal would be an affront to 
judicial economy inasmuch as the very 
purpose of such a motion is to allow a trial 
court to correct its own errors, thus avoiding 
needless appeals. Cf. 17-Af Invs., 65S P.2d at 
1187 (recognizing that the requirement of 
filing a notice of appeal after disposition of a 
post-judgment motion "may assist in disco-
uraging delay in the judicial process"); 9 
James W. Moore et a/., Moore's Federal 
Practice 204.12[1], at 4-68, 4-69 & n.5 (2d 
ed. 1991) (stating that "[t]he very purpose of 
such [post-judgmentj motions is to permit 
the trial court to correct its own errors, and 
thus avoid needless appeals"). 
In the instant case, summary judgment was 
entered on May 2, 1990. DeBrys filed their 
Rule 52(b) motion on May 7, 1990, and their 
notice of appeal on May 22, 1990. The trial 
court denied DeBrys' Rule 52(b) motion on 
December 11, 1990. No further appeal was 
filed. As previously noted, Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires the filing of 
a new notice of appeal within the prescribed 
time after entry of the trial court's order dis-
posing of a Rule 52(b) post-judgment 
motion. Because DeBrys failed to file a notice 
of appeal after the court denied their post-
judgment motion, we are without jurisdiction 
and the appeal is dismissed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Appeals involving other parties in this action are 
now before this court. 
2. Rule 4-504(2) provides that *[c]opies of the 
proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be 
served upon opposing counsel before being prese-
nted to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be sub-
mitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after service. * 
3. Rule 52(b) provides in relevant part that "[ujpon 
motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings 
or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly." 
4. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend is 
the subject of a separate notice of appeal filed on 
January 28,1992. 
5. In addition, DeBrys contend that the court erred 
by prematurely signing the findings of fact, concl-
usions of law, and judgment before the time for 
objections had run pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. DeBrys' 
counsel was served with a copy of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment 
on April 24, 1990, and all other counsel were served 
by mail on April 25, 1990. This service by mail, they 
claim, added three days to their five-day objections 
period of Rule 4-504(2), and therefore, all counsel 
had until May 7, 1990, to file their objections. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e). 
DeBrys' argument is without merit. They were 
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment on April 24, 1990. 
Pursuant to the five-day objections period of Rule 
4-504(2), excluding the intermediate Saturday and 
Sunday as required by Rule 6(a), DeBrys' objections 
were due May 1, 1990. On May 2, 1990, the trial 
court signed and the clerk of the court entered the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. 
Although the five-day objections period for 
other counsel had not yet run, inasmuch as they 
were served by mail on April 25, 1990, the court's 
apparent oversight is inconsequential for two 
reasons. First, no other parties had an interest in 
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nor did they oppose Fidelity's motion for summary 
judgment Second, no objections were filed by other 
counsel, nor have other counsel complained that 
they should have been allowed to file objections. 
6 A motion is an application made to the court for 
the purpose of obtaining a ruling or order directing 
some act to be done in favor of the applicant Elliot 
v Elliot, 797 S.W 2d 388, 392 (Tex Ct App 1990) 
7 Rule 4(b) provides m relevant part 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial 
court by any party under Rule 52(b) 
to amend or make additional findings of 
fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted . the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying such motion A 
notice of appeal filed before the dispo-
sition of any of the above motions shall 
have no effect A new nonce of appeal 
must be filed withm the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of 
the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above 
8 Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 
10 days after entry of the judgment " 
9 This is consistent with the requirement that the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally const-
rued. Utah R. Civ P 1(a) 
10 Additional reasons support the trial court's 
constructton of DeBrys' motion as a Rule 52(b) post-
judgment motion. After filing their motion, DeBrys 
made no attempt to withdraw the motion, nor did 
they attempt to communicate to the trial court that 
it was not a post-judgment motion Despite their 
knowledge that judgment had been entered five days 
prior to the filing of their motion, DeBrys proce-
eded to file a notice of appeal Moreover, by recei-
ving a copy of the proposed order almost a month 
before the trial court's order disposing of their 
motion, DeBrys were on notice that the court would 
construe their motion as a Rule 52(b) post-
judgment motion. 
11 The instant case is readily distinguishable from 
Nccnngs v Utah State Bar, 817 P 2d 320 (Utah 
1991), where the Utah Supreme Court held that 
motions for entry of findings, pursuant to Rule 
52(a) or (b), filed after a trial court's granting of 
summary judgment without findings of fact, does 
not toll the time for appeal Id at 321-23 In 
contrast, the trial court in the case at bar sua sponte 
requested and signed findings of fact and conclus-
ions of law after granting Fidelity's motion for 
summary judgment Moreover, DeBrys* post-
judgment motion, in contrast with that filed m Necr-
mgSy did not request an entry of findings, 
rather it requested the trial court to amend and 
make additional findings of fact and conclusions of 
law 
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ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Heinz appeals the trial court's 
judgment interpreting a settlement agreement 
m favor of plaintiff, the personal representa-
tive of the Estate of James A. Collier. Heinz 
also appeals the trial court's award of atto-
rney fees to the estate We affirm the trial 
court's interpretation of the settlement agre-
ement and reverse the award of attorney fees. 
FACTS 
Defendant Heinz and James Collier were 
business partners in a number of general and 
limited partnerships Upon Collier's death, 
Heinz and some of these partnerships brought 
claims against Collier's estate relating to the 
partnership agreements. Similarly, the estate 
filed claims against Heinz and many of the 
partnerships. 
On February 12, 1988, after months of 
negotiations, the estate and Heinz, both rep-
resented by counsel, entered into a settlement 
agreement. In this agreement, Heinz gave up 
certain rights and claims against the estate in 
consideration for the estate's release of some 
of its rights and claims against Heinz. Subse-
quent to this agreement, a dispute arose over 
the rights of Heinz and the estate concerning 
the distribution of assets from one of their 
dissolved partnerships. Under the settlement 
agreement, the estate maintained a fifty 
percent general partnership interest m that 
partnership. The trial court held that the lan-
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DeBry, 
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Attorneys: Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
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Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Billings (Law and Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Both parties have filed memoranda in 
response to the motion. We summarily affirm on the basis that 
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review. 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity). On 
April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to appellants7 counsel. 
The findings were mailed to all other counsel on April 25, 1990. 
On May 2, 1990, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment to the trial court, and the court 
signed the findings, conclusions, and judgment. 
Five days after the judgment was entered, appellants filed 
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The document objected to the 
findings and conclusions and asserted that specific additional 
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findings and conclusions should be mac r- May 22, 1990, 
appellants filed a notice of appeal fr-.n trie- trial court's May 2 
order granting summary judgment. On December 11, 19. 3, the trial 
court characterized appellants' objections as a Rule 52(b) motion 
and denied the motion. Appellants did not file a notice of 
appeal from the December 11, 1990 order. As a result, this court 
dismissed appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the 
basis that appellants failed to file a new notice of appeal after 
the court denied appellants Rule 52(b) motion. DeBry v. Fidelity 
National Title Ins. Co., 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. March 
18, 1992). On December 21, 1991, appellants filed a motion to 
amend the December 11, 1990 order. The court denied the motion, 
and appellants filed this appeal. 
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated seven 
procedural rules in obtaining the December 11, 1990 order. 
However, on November 16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel 
a copy of the proposed order denying appellants' objections and 
additions to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Appellants did not object to the proposed order and did not raise 
any of the alleged procedural irregularities. In addition, 
appellants' motion to amend the December 11 order did not mention 
any of the asserted irregularities but merely sought to delete 
references to Rule 52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants 
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity committed 
procedural violations in obtaining the December 11 order. 
We summarily affirm on the basis that the appeal presents no 
substantial issue for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(c). We decline 
to award attorney fees on appeal. 
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Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions and renumbered the remaining subdivisions 
(5)(C) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for accordingly, making appropriate reference 
"court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "pre- changes throughout; in present Subdivision 
siding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdi- (3), deleted "audited" before "financial state-
vision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "Feb- ment" and substituted "surety" for "company" 
ruary 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivi- in the first sentence and substituted "the 
sion (7); and made stylistic changes through- value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of 
out. credit dollars" in the second sentence; in 
The 1990 amendment, in Subdivision (1) present Subdivision (5), substituted "current 
added "or if the statement is made on behalf of assets" for "real assets" in two places; and re-
a business or corporation, a statement that the wrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table 
business or corporation" to the introductory setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstand-
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic ing to net worth value, 
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete Ian- The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer-
guage relating to appraisals and inserted "pre- cial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading, 
pared by a certified public accountant"; redes- inserted "re-qualification and disqualification" 
ignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present and "commercial" in the Intent section, and 
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4), substantially rewrote the rule. 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of* the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
nated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar 
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any 
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this 
rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
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partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a-request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
- matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. " 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a 
detailed description is impracticable. 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of 
the proposed order" following "supporting doc-
umentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
in Subdivision (3)(b). 
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Rule 4-504, Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small 
claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) ..Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon oPTKVfijpp- fipimggl Wnrp Vainer nyesented \n tf|p court, for s t a t u r e unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal.,, 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint 
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
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(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court, 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agree-
ment which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- The 1991 amendment added the final sen-
ment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "ex- tence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not 
cept small claims" under "Applicability" and of record" following "courts of record" in the 
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivi-
of the Rule. sion (10). 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavi 
of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the 
Statement of the Rule: 
** 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must 
the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, 
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent 
the claimoto judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matte] 
for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonat 
fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persor 
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate bi 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sui 
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consis 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT 
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING 
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL 
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they 
conform to the provisions of this rule and to state statute and case law. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- (2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision 
ment inserted "be filed with the court and" in (1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivi-
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision sion designation and the phrase beginning 
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements "and" at the end. 
other than hourly rates, added the designation 
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eree's order to participate m appeal secured by specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. as terminating reference, 71 A L.R 4th 889 
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Referee's failure to file report withm time et seq. 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT, 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
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whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs-in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January I, 1985. See, 
now, Rule 34(d), UtahR.App.P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b). 
Judges* retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
§ 49-6-301. 
State, payment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award 
—Depositions 
—Discretionary. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
-"-Attorney's fee award. 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
—Review of finality. 
—Separate claim. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings 
Specific performance request. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
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entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with 
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice 
and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment 
which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force 
and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the 
clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court upon the request of either party 
made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters 
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in 
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the 
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an 
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded 
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party 
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days 
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to 
have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within 
the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment 
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill, 
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the 
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of 
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A 
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in 
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and 
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979. 
Error §§ 1009 to 1024. Key Numbers. — Costs *» 221 et seq. 
Rule 35, Petition for rehearing. 
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A 
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A 
petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the 
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by 
order. The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact 
which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and 
shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner de-
sires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless re-
quested by the court. The answer to the petition for rehearing shall be filed 
within 14 days after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless 
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otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in 
the absence of a request for an answer. 
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by 
Rule 27 and copies shall be served and filed as prescribed by Rule 26. Except 
by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by 
the court shall not exceed 15 pages. 
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the 
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may 
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such 
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the partic-
ular case. 
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are 
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing 
will not be received by the clerk. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
substantially redrafted to provide definitions sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de- first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
lays and frivolous appeals. the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Ifan appeal is found to be frivolous, the court Anders v California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
must award damages. This is in keeping with State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
However, the amount of damages — single or sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
to make express the authority of the court to peal. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 829 
Error §§ 978 to 984. to 835. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 1408 
to 1452. 
Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur. 
(a) Date of issuance. The remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after 
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the 
remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order dispos-
ing of the petition. The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, 
enlarged, or shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of 
the court, any direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall 
constitute the remittitur. 
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending review. A stay or superse-
deas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application for review may be 
granted on motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or 
for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying, 
restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must 
ordinarily be made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision 
appealed from. A motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court, 
but the motion shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is 
not practicable, or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a 
motion or has failed to afford the relief which the movant requested, with the 
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